Intimidating a public servant washington

After Sergeant Jones twice warned Montano to stop resisting, and when Montano failed to comply and approached Jones, Jones tased Montano.

And in , where the defendant’s actions showed only that he was angry, the court held that no Page 878 reasonable jury could have inferred that the defendant was attempting to influence the police officer; some evidence must independently support the “attempt to influence” element of the crime.

¶13 The rules of court’s conclusion that the officer had abandoned his pursuit appears to be unsupported.

The court reversed the conviction, holding that “[e]vidence of anger alone is insufficient to establish intent to influence [a public servant’s] behavior.” (1998) (holding that the intimidation statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad).

In that case, the court observed that the “`attempt to influence'” element of the crime cannot be satisfied by threats alone .

¶5 The State charged Montano with intimidating a public servant, fourth degree assault, and resisting arrest.

Montano moved to dismiss the intimidation charge pursuant to (1986).

Specifically, we must determine whether a judge or jury may infer, from threats and other actions, that a defendant attempted to influence an official action by a public servant.

The trial court ruled that, in the absence of direct evidence of such an attempt, the prosecution failed to make a prima facie case of intimidation.

On appeal, the court reasoned that the evidence did not support a jury’s inference that the defendant intended to influence the police officer’s official actions.

Though the defendant’s actions demonstrated his anger at the situation and at the officer, those actions — by themselves — did not evidence an attempt to influence an action by the officer.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the charge, concluding that the State provided insufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of intimidation.

Tags: , ,